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Abstract 
Selection and design of appropriate government policies to support electric vehicle (EV) 
adoption can be aided by modelling the future impact of policy instruments relative to a given 
baseline estimate.  This paper highlights the innovative application of a diffusion model to 
analyse complex impacts of EV policy instruments on future incremental EV uptake.  Several 
versions of four key policy instruments are tested in the model:  linking electric vehicle sales 
to Renewable Electricity Purchases (RE-EV), financial subsidies, smart charging incentives 
and a common cost metric to educate consumers about the lifetime costs of EVs.  Market 
share between battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), 
hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) were 
forecasted out to the year 2034 across all 1.5 million households in the state of Victoria, 
Australia.  The RE-EV scenario had the strongest performance in terms of economic and 
societal indicators.  Non-subsidy policy instruments can also support uptake of EVs, 
especially in the case of encouraging BEV adoption. We found feebate scenarios were more 
effective policies than rebates.  Rebate and feebate scenarios applied within the 2014-2019 
timeframe compared better than those with longer timeframes.  Our analyses showed how 
combined policy scenarios not only further improved EV uptake but also allowed government 
to fund rebates through feebate income.  
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1. Introduction 
The age of electric vehicles (EVs) has begun. The world’s largest car companies including 
Toyota, GM, Ford and Nissan have all begun mass production and new entrants such as 
Tesla are quickly gaining in popularity with sales expectations exceed 55,000 vehicles this 
year (Debord, 2015). Several credible sources forecast that, over the next 30 years, plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs), or collectively “EVs”, 
will be the dominant cars sold in the Australian market (AECOM, 2011; Graham, Reedman, 
& Poldy, 2008). This trend has the potential to bring substantial benefits in terms of air and 
greenhouse emissions, the economy and potentially the electricity system. Country to 
country variation and the rate of diffusion will be strongly correlated to policies at various 
levels of government. In this regard, Australia has the opportunity to lead the EV charge 
through the development and implementation of good policies.  
Our paper addresses major knowledge gaps, namely: the potential impact that specific 
government policy instruments will have on EV uptake and diffusion.  For this modelling 
research, we use Victoria, Australia as a case study to model four different policy 
instruments, including EV-Renewable Energy Coupling, Financial Subsidies and Fees, Smart 
Charging Incentives and creation of a Common Cost Metric.  Specifically, we model policies 
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that are implemented over a twenty-year time frame, from 2014 to 2034.  The objective of 
this analysis is to compare and contrast the relative impacts of each policy type in terms of 
additional vehicle years, societal benefit cost ratio, and gross cost effectiveness to provide 
indicative guidance on the relative performance of varying policy types, when implemented 
individually and simultaneously.  
This work builds on previous research undertaken as part of the Electric Driveway Project, a 
three year collaborative study in Victoria investigating the potential for integration of EVs into 
the transport sector and household power systems (Paevere et al 2012) in Australia.  This 
research also builds on previous investigations of EV technologies, barriers and policies, and 
diffusion modelling (Usher, Horgan, Dunstan, & Paevere, 2011; Usher et al., 2011; Usher et 
al., 2012; Paevere et al., 2012). 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Evaluating the real-world impact of policies on EV uptake 
There are several precedents for quantifying the impact of policy initiatives on EV adoption 
internationally. While examining government policy and the development of EV’s in Japan, 
Åhman (2006) found that through legislation and standards implemented by the government, 
niche markets and R&D initiatives were established for generating newer targeted 
technology advances. Furthermore, he concluded that flexibility, adaptability and cooperation 
are imperative to the outcome and success of the policies (Åhman, 2006). Many countries 
have used tax incentives to increase consumer adoption of EV’s. Through extensive 
research, it has been found that tax rebates used in Canadian provinces have had a 
significant impact on increasing hybrid vehicle sales (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011).  
Furthermore, if these policies and technical initiatives are delivered at the right time they can 
have a strong influence on EV market penetration (Nemry and Brons, 2010). 
2.2 Modelling EV uptake and the impact of policies 
As international electric vehicle adoption increases, several studies have forecasted the 
diffusion of this technology over the medium and long terms in Australia (Graham et al. 2008; 
AECOM, 2011; Higgins et al. 2012).   
Graham et al. (2008) used an Energy Sector Model to forecast a 33 percent share of road 
vehicle fleet for PHEVs and BEVs by 2050.  HEVs are projected to account for another 50 
percent of the fleet, leaving internal combustion vehicles occupying only one sixth of vehicles 
(Graham et al, 2008).  
AECOM (2011) considered a 30-year time frame for vehicle uptake in Metropolitan Victoria.  
Their study differentiates between vehicle sizes, distance travelled, and vehicle type and 
three scenarios are compared against a base case.   The three scenarios have varying 
amounts of charging facilities and service stations available.  The characteristics of the base 
case and Scenario 3, along with the resulting annual market sales, are presented in Table 1: 
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Table 1: Predicted EV vehicle sales per year (‘000) in 2034 in Metropolitan Victoria (adapted and 
estimated from AECOM, 2011), which includes small, medium, large passenger vehicles as well 
as light commercial vehicles and taxis 
Scenario Assumptions Results 
Vehicle sales per year 
(‘000) in 2034 (% of 
annual market sales) 
HEV PHEV BEV 
Base 
Case  
Only ICEs and 
HEVs available 
(no PHEVs or 
BEVs)  
The sale of HEVs grows 
gradually to 2014 then increases 
rapidly following the removal of 
the supply constraint in 2015 
and the convergence of HEV 
purchase prices to that of an 
ICE vehicle in 2020.   
255 
 
(71%) 
 
 
0 0 
Scenario 
3  
Level 1 and Level 
2 household 
charging, Level 2 
public charging in 
the Victorian 
Metropolitan 
Region and EV 
service stations 
that offer quick 
charge or battery 
replacement. 
PHEVs and BEVs gradually 
become the dominant engine 
configuration in the mid-2020s 
as prices converge with ICE 
vehicles. The share of HEVs 
declines dramatically as PHEVs 
grow to hold the largest share of 
sales by the mid-2020s. PHEVs 
remain the largest proportion of 
sales in 2040 however BEVs 
20% by 2040. 
75 
 
(21%) 
195 
 
(55%) 
55 
 
(15%) 
 
In sum, the AECOM vehicle choice model predicts a transition to HEVs in the near term (5-
10 years), especially for the small passenger vehicle category; PHEVs over the medium to 
long term (10-20 years) and BEVs over the long term (15 years plus) (2011).  AECOM also 
concludes that the take-up of PHEVs and BEVs is sensitive to the year in which parity with 
internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) is achieved.   They also found the provision of 
charging infrastructure (both public and commercial) is expected to have a significant impact 
on the sales of BEVs.  
At the state scale, CSIRO modeled and published findings for Victoria, Australia, based on 
an earlier version of the model also used for this research (Higgins et al., 2012).  The model 
was tested to forecast market share of EVs through to 2030, using vehicle stock across all 
1.5 million households in Victoria, Australia.  Assuming the stock of HEVs was 3% in 2011 
(consistent with AECOM, 2011) and calibrating the model to Graham, et al (2008), Higgins et 
al. found that in a base case, the share of BEVs increases significantly from 2020 (versus 
PHEV) due to projected performance improvements and falling prices.  
2.3 Innovations of this research 
This research builds on previous work (Higgins, et al., 2012) by using the model to 
extensively evaluate four types of government policies in Victoria, across a range of policy 
scenarios and implementation time frames.  Additionally, key model improvements have 
been made, as described in the method section below.  
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3. Diffusion Model 
The diffusion model combines features of choice modelling, multi-criteria analysis and 
dynamic systems. The primary goal of a diffusion model is to forecast the stock of each 
vehicle option at incremental time intervals (e.g. 3-monthly) through to a target date.  The 
multi-criteria analysis features accommodate the different variables that influence when a 
consumer will replace their existing vehicle and what vehicle option will replace it. The model 
provides a capability to analyse adoption patterns of the competing vehicle options under a 
range of features that a buyer would consider for a purchase.  A full mathematical description 
is contained in Higgins et al (2012).   
The model is dynamic in that it updates the eligible purchasers and choice amongst possible 
options at each time interval. The number of households eligible to purchase a vehicle in a 
given time period, is a statistical function of lifespan of the vehicle that they already have and 
other variables that may determine whether the consumer will replace the vehicle sooner. 
For example, a high-income household may replace their vehicle sooner than a lower income 
household.   
Once the number of households eligible to purchase in a given time period is determined, the 
next "closely linked" decision is what choice to make amongst the competing vehicle options. 
This is where the choice modelling component comes in. The probability of choosing a BEV 
vs PHEV vs HEV vs ICE is a weighted logistic function of the range of variables that a 
consumer would consider when making a choice. Once the probability of choosing each 
option is calculated, the model updates the stock of each option in the current time interval 
and then proceeds to the next. 
In constructing a suitable diffusion/choice model, the original model developed for forecasting 
uptake of electric vehicle options (Higgins et al 2012) was extended to include several novel 
features. In Higgins et al (2012) the time between replacement of a vehicle was fixed. In this 
paper, the probability of vehicle replacement is a function of failure time (or average length of 
time between replacement), as well as a utility sub-function of other drivers of replacement. 
When implemented, it accommodates the socio- demographic differences of consumers who 
are early versus late replacers of the technology, as well as the effects of incentives to 
reduce the time to replacement.  
When considering a long forecasting horizon, there is the need to incorporate differences in 
familiarity (or perceived risk) between consumers replacing their EV with another EV versus 
first time purchasers.  The feature can also accommodate differences in upfront costs. For 
example a consumer purchasing an EV for the first time may purchase charging 
infrastructure or Vehicle-to-Grid connectivity, which would not be required again when 
purchasing a replacement EV.  
To set up the diffusion model, a suitable typology was produced to represent all possible 
combinations of location, building type, demographics and number of vehicles. The resulting 
typology has about 142,000 categories for Victoria.  
The variables used in the model are contained in Table 2. These represent key features of 
EVs that consumers would consider when purchasing the vehicle. The weights in Table 2 
were calibrated into the model using two methods.  Firstly, a large-scale survey of 2,500 
individuals was undertaken across Victoria and the results are contained in Gardner et al 
(2011). The survey was informed by a previous focus group study and literature review of 
consumer behaviour for low emission technologies. This research highlighted the relative 
importance of different demographic and psychographic criteria, as well as perceptions of 
technology specific factors, such as upfront costs, range, and potential to reduce emissions.  
The surveys show that households with incomes greater than AU$75,000/year would pay a 
higher upfront price for a vehicle compared to the lower-income categories.  Secondly, model 
parameters in Table 2 were scaled so that the “state wide” market share for the ICEV and 
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HEV vehicle types, aggregated across Victoria, matched that of Graham et al (2008) for their 
scenario "Energy Information Administration – emissions target 60% below 2000 by 2050 for 
high oil price for ICE".  The national level projections of Graham et al (2008) were chosen as 
the base case benchmark for the diffusion modelling in this report, as they were developed 
by a group of leading community, industry and government experts. The scaling of the 
weights accommodated the differences in assumptions made in the Graham et al (2008) 
report.   
Weights in Table 2 are not always proportional to the priority of the criteria, as they also 
depend on the variability and distribution of the scores. For example, driving distances will 
form a negative exponential distribution across households due to the much higher 
proportion of households being located in cities. A transformation function was applied to the 
scores of the ‘Driving Distance’ criteria (Higgins et al, 2012) to reduce the effect of very long 
distances (e.g. rural areas) and increase the differentiation of inner versus outer Melbourne 
suburbs. 
Table 2. Description of variables used in the diffusion model 
Criteria Initial settings (all financial figures in 
AUD) 
Annual change 
with time 
Weight 
Familiarity 
 
Starting at 0 as there are presently 
less than 100 EVs in Victoria 
Familiarity score 
is proportional to 
their market 
share in that 
locality. 
1.1 
Performance  
Scale of 0 (worst) – 10 
(best) 
BEV: 4  
PHEV: 8 
HEV: 8 
ICEV: 9 
BEV: 3% 
PHEV: 0.5% 
HEV: 0.25% 
ICEV: 0% 
2 
Upfront cost 
(small/large vehicle) 
BEV: $43/$80K, PHEV: $39/$70K, 
HEV: $35/$63K, ICEV:  $18/$45K 
 2.5 
Annual cost 
(small/large vehicle) 
BEV: $2.3/$2.8K,PHEV: $2.4/ $3K 
HEV: $2.7/$3.3K, ICEV: $3.5/$4.5K 
BEV: 2.5%, 
PHEV: 2.5%, 
HEV: 2.5%, 
ICEV: 3% 
2 
Household income 
Divided into brackets 
<$30K 
$30-75K and >$75K 
3%  2 
Demographic suitability Different for each household group 0 4 
Driving distance 
 
Twice distance from nearest major 
CCD 
0 1.5 
 
4. Policy Instruments 
A brief description of the policies, their associated model inputs and how these inputs impact 
the various parameters in the model is presented below.  See Usher et al. (2012) for further 
explanation of the methodology used to develop the model inputs. All scenarios are 
compared against Scenario 100 which is the case of no policy interventions. 
4.1 RE-EV Coupling 
The RE-EV policy refers to the connection of renewable energy use/purchases to the number 
of EVs sold or EV vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT).  Connecting renewable energy targets 
6 
or purchase to EV growth will ensure a transition to zero-emission motoring.  This policy is 
also expected to encourage adoption of EVs by attracting individuals who are concerned 
about the environment (Gardner et al., 2011).  In the model, the RE-EV policy is expected to 
increase the ‘Demographic Suitability’ weighting, by 20% for only those consumers whose 
demographics are more suited to BEVs.  For PHEV-suited demographics, we increase the 
Demographic Suitability proportional to the percent of driving that is electric. This change in 
weighting has the effect of increasing the non-financial attractiveness of EVs in locations that 
are already more likely to purchase EVs due to transport mode and household 
demographics. The following policy was modelled for RE-EV: 
Scenario 101 (RE-EV): Government increases the renewable energy target based on the 
sales of EV (with no additional cost to consumers), implemented from 2014 – 2034. 
4.2 Smart-charging (ToU) 
In this paper, smart-charging policy refers to Time of Use (ToU) tariffs.  In the model, the 
smart charging policies impact the ‘Annual Cost’ parameter.  ToU tariffs are designed to 
incentivise drivers to charge their EVs during off-peak periods.  The benefit accrued to EV 
owners for ToU charging was estimated as the avoided cost of charging off-peak versus on-
peak (an annual savings of AU$150 was used in the model). Whilst this is a small financial 
incentive compared to upfront rebates, it is paid every year during the life of the EV 
ownership.  It will have a greater effect on the probability of purchasing an EV as the price 
reduction in EVs slows towards 2034. The following ToU policy was modelled: 
Scenario 104 (ToU): ToU annual incentive of AU$150 per year, 2014 - 2034 
4.3 Common Cost Metric 
Consumers interested in buying EVs may be aware of the lower fuel prices (electricity 
compared to petrol) but few have a clear awareness of the comparative running costs 
(Gardner et al., 2011).   As part of consumer education, government could implement a 
common cost metric to summarise the total life cycle costs of EVs and ICEVs.  Research has 
shown that providing meaningful numbers to consumers on delayed costs and benefits will 
change consumer behaviour (GHK Consulting, 2010).  The model aims to capture this effect 
by advancing the level of familiarity forward by 2 years. The greater the market share of a 
vehicle, the greater the familiarity relative to the other vehicle types. Moving the familiarity 
forward by 2 years is achieved by calculating the familiarity as a function of the market share 
of the EV two years out in the base case. For example, under the CCM scenario, the 
familiarity in 2014 is calculated as a function of the Base Case market share in 2016. The 
following scenario of this policy was modelled: 
Scenario 108 (CCM): 2 year familiarity advance, 2024 - 2034 
4.4 Rebates and feebates 
For consumers that do not prioritise ‘green’ values or who do not have a comparison of life 
cycle costs between EV and ICEV ownership, the upfront price difference can dissuade them 
from investing in EVs (Gardner et al, 2011). Financial incentives help overcome the actual or 
perceived gap in payback periods of EVs verses ICEVs (Usher et al., 2012).  Additionally, 
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financial incentives help account for unpriced external costs of ICEVs.  Within the model, 
rebates impact the Upfront Cost variable.  
Rebates equal to 50% of the cost difference between EVs and ICEVs were modelled, albeit 
with two different maximums: AU$3,000 and AU$7,500.  There is a considerable range in the 
price of EVs, depending on their size (large and small) and technology type (PHEV and BEV) 
in comparison to ICEVs.  Additionally, the projected cost decrease in EVs varies based on 
the technology.  A rebate based on the percentage difference in cost to ICEVs more 
equitably incentivises the range of EV types, manufactures and sizes.  These two rebates 
were modelled with varying durations, including a 20-year time frame (2014 – 2034) and 5-
year time frames (starting in 2014 and 2019, respectively), which equates to six rebate 
scenarios in total.  
Scenario Description Start year Duration (years) 
110: 50% of difference up to AU$3000 2014 20 
111: 50% of difference up to AU$3000 2014 5 
112: 50% of difference up to AU$3000 2019 5 
114: 50% of difference up to AU$7,500 2014 20 
115: 50% of difference up to AU$7,500 2014 5 
116: 50% of difference up to AU$7,500 2019 5 
 
Nine feebate scenarios were also modelled.  A feebate policy is one in which fees and 
rebates are coupled to make a more budget neutral policy.  Specifically, fees are charged 
against the purchase of ICEVs while rebates are provided for EVs and therefore put pressure 
on the vehicle market from both sides.  Rebates equal to 50% of the cost difference between 
EVs and ICEVs, up to AU$3,000 were modelled with a fee of 1%, which increased by 1% per 
year.  Similarly, rebates of 50% of the cost difference up to AU$7,500, and AU$12,000, were 
modelled with fees to the vehicle owner of 2% (increasing by 2% each year (e.g. 4% in year 
2)for the duration listed below) and 3.5% (increasing by 3.5% each year), respectively.  
These three feebate policies were also modelled for the same durations as the rebates. 
Scenario Description Start year Duration (years) 
118: Fees 1%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$3,000 2014 20 
119: Fees 1%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$3,000 2014 5 
120: Fees 1%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$3,000 2019 5 
122: Fees 2%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$7,500 2014 20 
123: Fees 2%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$7,500 2014 5 
124: Fees 2%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$7,500 2019 5 
126: Fees 3.5%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$12,000 2014 20 
127: Fees 3.5%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$12,000 2014 5 
128: Fees 3.5%.  Rebates 50% up to AU$12,000 2019 5 
 
4.5 Combined policies 
In order to model the impact of concurrent policy implementation, seven variations of 
combined policy scenarios were modelled.  Four of the combined policy scenarios include a 
mix of two or three policies.   In order to illustrate the potential objective of grouping certain 
policy instruments, we have given these combined policies a qualitative descriptor as well.  
 Scenario 130: Aimed at environmental early adopters (RE-EV + Feebate [123]) 
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 Scenario 131: Aimed at technology early adopters (RE-EV & CCM) 
 Scenario 132: Address the price gap between ICEVs and EVs (CCM + Feebate [126]) 
 Scenario 133: Least cost to government (CCM, RE-EV, ToU) 
 
The other three combined policy scenarios are variations of implementing the non-financial 
policy instruments with three different financial instruments.  Specifically, in the following 
scenarios, RE-EV, CCM and ToU were modelled with:  
Scenario 134: Feebate [123] 
Scenario 135: Feebate [126] 
Scenario 136: Feebate [118] 
These three scenarios were chosen as they appeared to maximize the uptake of EVs at the 
lowest cost to society and government against a larger set of combined scenarios modelled. 
5. Results 
The modelled outcomes of the policy scenarios are presented below, including their impact 
on PHEV and BEV market share in comparison to the base case (defined as an additional 
EV on the road for one year), EV sales, and carbon emissions.  Economic performance is 
also discussed in terms of including net government impact (AU$B), net consumer impact 
(AU$B), government gross cost effectiveness (AU$/additional EV year) and the societal 
benefit cost ratio (BCR).   
Table 3. Analysis of policy performance  
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100 11.2% 27.2% - 38.4% 0.0% - - - - 
101 13.8% 28.7% 1.3 42.5% 4.1% -0.1 0.9 110 2.8 
104 12.0% 30.4% 1.0 42.4% 4.0% 0.0 0.4 0 1.9 
108 12.2% 30.3% 2.0 42.5% 4.1% 0.0 0.4 0 1.4 
Rebate 
110 11.3% 33.5% 1.8 44.8% 6.4% -2.7 3.3 1705 1.8 
111 11.2% 27.5% 0.3 38.7% 0.3% -0.2 0.4 891 3.8 
112 11.3% 28.6% 0.7 39.8% 1.4% -0.6 0.9 1004 2.1 
114 10.8% 37.4% 3.4 48.2% 9.8% -4.6 5.6 1594 1.7 
115 11.2% 28.1% 0.9 39.2% 0.8% -0.7 1.2 1013 2.4 
116 11.2% 29.8% 1.4 41.0% 2.6% -1.2 1.7 1052 1.8 
Feebate 
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118 11.6% 36.6% 3.7 48.3% 9.9% 0.4 0.5 1205 1.4 
119 11.2% 27.6% 0.5 38.8% 0.4% 0.4 -0.2 715 1.9 
120 11.3% 28.9% 1.0 40.1% 1.7% -0.2 0.5 852 1.8 
122 11.1% 43.6% 7.1 54.7% 16.3% -0.1 1.6 1152 1.4 
123 11.1% 28.4% 1.4 39.5% 1.1% 0.4 0.0 882 1.6 
124 11.2% 30.5% 2.0 41.7% 3.3% -0.4 0.9 899 1.6 
126 11.1% 47.1% 9.6 58.2% 19.8% 1.3 0.4 1034 1.4 
127 11.1% 28.8% 2.0 39.9% 1.5% 1.0 -0.5 876 1.4 
128 11.2% 31.0% 2.4 42.2% 3.8% 0.1 0.5 822 1.6 
Combined 
130 13.6% 30.2% 3.0 43.8% 5.4% 0.1 1.0 497 1.9 
131 14.3% 31.0% 2.8 45.3% 6.9% -0.2 1.1 148 1.6 
132 13.7% 41.0% 9.2 54.7% 16.3% 2.0 0.0 1114 1.5 
133 15.1% 32.9% 3.6 48.0% 9.6% -0.1 1.4 53 1.9 
Balanced 
134 14.3% 31.2% 4.1 45.6% 7.2% -0.1 1.3 515 1.6 
135 16.6% 43.6% 11.3 60.2% 21.8% 0.3 2.7 954 1.6 
136 15.9% 38.5% 6.6 54.4% 11.9% -0.8 2.8 836 1.7 
 
Implemented individually, RE-EV, ToU and CCM each had similar impacts on EV adoption. 
The RE-EV scenario had the greatest impact on the BEV market share in 2034, both in 
comparison to the non-subsidy scenarios (Table 3) and the subsidy scenarios.  ToU and 
CCM had a greater impact on PHEV market share than the RE-EV scenario and all 5-year 
subsidy scenarios (except [124] and [128]).  
These non-subsidy policy scenarios, which were all modelled with a 20-year duration from 
2014 – 2034, increase both the BEV market share by 1-2.5% and the PHEV market by 1.5 to 
3%. In contrast, the rebate incentives shown in Table 3 had minimal impact on the BEV 
market share.   
When comparing the relative impact of the rebate scenarios to one another (Table 3), the two 
rebate scenarios with the 20-year duration [110 and 114] had the largest impact on PHEV 
market share and carbon savings, although 114 actually decreases the BEV market share.  
Both scenarios that offer rebates for only five years from 2014 to 2019 have a very small 
negative impact on PHEV market share [111 and 115].  A delayed five-year rebate, starting 
in 2019, performed only marginally better than the base case [112 and 116].   
Of the rebate scenarios with a 5-year duration, Scenario 116 has the greatest overall 
performance in terms of PHEV market share and carbon savings.  
Similar to rebates, the feebates (fees for ICEVS and rebates for EVs) had little to no impact 
on the BEV market share and scenarios implemented for the first five years [119, 123, and 
127] have the smallest impact on PHEV market share out of all feebates (Table 4).   
Combining the fees with the rebates achieved a higher market share than modelling the 
rebates alone.  For example, the PHEV market share in 2034 from a ‘50% rebate up to 
AU$3,000’ [110] for 20 years is 34%, versus 37% when adding a 1% fee to ICEVs with the 
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same policy [118], a difference of 3.1%.  The difference between ‘50% up to AU$7,500’ [114] 
is double that, at 6.2%, when compared to its feebate counterpart, ‘2% fee/50% rebate up to 
AU$7,500’ [122].  
When comparing the results for the 20-year feebate scenarios, there was a much greater 
increase in PHEV market share when jumping from the ‘1% fee/50% rebate up to AU$3,000’ 
[118] to the ‘2% fee/50% rebate up to AU$7,500’ [122], than from [122] to ‘3.5%fee/50% 
rebate up to AU$12,000’ [126].  The difference in PHEV market share in 2034 is 7% and 
3.5% respectively.  
Each of the combined policy packages in Table 3 increased the BEV market share by 2-3%, 
more than any of the individual rebate or feebate scenarios (except for RE-EV). The scenario 
that addresses payback gap [132] had the greatest impact on the PHEV market and carbon 
savings, out of all of the combined policies in. Note this combined scenario used the most 
progressive feebate modelled in this report. 
The ‘balanced’ policy packages, or the scenarios that model all four types of policy 
interventions measures, all have the greatest impact on BEV market, compared to any 
scenarios discussed thus far.  Similar to the scenario modelled above [132] which use the 
most progressive feebate, the scenario [135] with the same feebate had the greatest impact 
on BEV and PHEV market share in 2034, and the greatest of all policy scenarios modelled.  
The balanced policy package [136] with the smallest 20-year feebate achieved almost double 
the additional EV uptake above base case than the balanced policy package with a 5-year, 
but more progressive feebate [134].  
The impact of selected policy scenarios on the Victorian EV market share are in Figure 1.  
The non-subsidy incentives all have a very similar impact on EV market share, bringing the 
percentage to 42%, or 4% greater than the base case.  The selected feebate [118] and 
Combined [133] also have very similar impacts on market share (an increase of almost 10%).  
Comparing [133], which is the “Least Cost to Government” to the non-subsidy scenarios 
demonstrates how implementing CCM, ToU, and RE-EV together can achieve a greater 
market impact that implementing any of them individually (an increase of almost 6% market 
share). 
Figure 1. Victorian EV Market Share, 2014 - 2034 
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5.1 Economic Performance 
The economic performance of the policy scenarios is compared on four indicators, including 
net government impact (AU$B), net consumer impact (AU$B), government gross cost 
effectiveness (AU$/additional EV year) and the societal BCR.  See Usher et al., (2012) for 
further explanation of the cost and benefit estimates, and the methodology for the economic 
analysis.  
The non-financial scenarios had little or no government costs and were therefore relatively 
cost effective for government (Table 3).  Table 3 also contrasts the non-financial scenarios to 
three indicative rebates ([110], [111], [116]) and two feebates ([118] and [123]).  
Rebate [111] and the RE-EV policy have the greatest societal BCR of all modelled scenarios 
(3.8 and 2.8). The scenarios with the greatest government cost effectiveness (aside from 
ToU which does not involve government funding) are CCM, RE-EV, Feebate [123], and 
Rebate [111]. 
The policy package with the highest societal BCRs, in terms of all combined scenarios, did 
not include financial incentives [Least cost to government].  The policy package aimed at 
early adopters performed well across all indicators (in the top five for all indicators accept net 
consumer impact).  
6. Discussion 
The number of registered HEVs in Victoria has increased by 26% from 2009 to 2012, with a 
total of 4,125 HEVs registered in 2012. This number can be contrasted with the expected 
number of EVs in the base case scenario, beginning 2014, of 89,000 EVs. While the model 
was calibrated to Graham et al (2008), the base case may have a higher prediction than 
what can be expected without any policy interventions. However, several interesting 
performance comparisons can be made amongst the modelled policies, both in terms of EV 
market share increase and economic performance. To enable the comparisons, the key 
performance indicators have been normalised (as shown in Table 3) and the highest value 
results are presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. The key performance indicators for the various policies scenarios, specifically the 
non-subsidy scenarios with the best subsidy scenarios for rebates, feebates and 
combined/balanced policies (defined as the scenario with the highest overall value). 
 
6.1 Subsidies versus non-subsidy scenarios 
By comparing the performance of individually implemented, non-subsidy policies (RE-EV, 
CCM, ToU) versus subsidy policies, the model predicts that non-subsidy incentives have a 
greater impact on the EV market than the subsidy incentives in several ways.  The RE-EV 
scenario had the greatest impact on BEVs by 2034 compared to any other rebate or feebate, 
regardless of the size, timeframe or duration of the subsidy scenario (total BEV market share 
of 2.6% greater than base case).   Conversely, rebates and feebates had negligible impact 
on BEV market share, regardless of the policy start year or duration (+/-0.4% from base 
case).  Additionally, RE-EV, ToU and CCM were predicted to produce an EV market share of 
at least 42.4% (4% greater than base case), which is greater than the impact of all individual 
rebates and feebates with a 5-year time frame (which had a range of 0.3% and 3.8% greater 
than base case).  What this suggests is that non-subsidy policy instruments can be an 
important policy lever for government in supporting the uptake of EVs, especially in the case 
of encouraging BEV adoption.  
6.2 Rebates versus feebates 
Feebates (coupling EV rebates with fees for ICEVs) were more effective overall than 
implementing rebates alone and can lead a positive net financial impact for government, 
suggesting that if governments are investigating EV rebate incentives, a fee counterpart 
should also be investigated. Feebates in particular outperform rebates in net government 
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impact and Government gross cost effectiveness; however rebates perform better Societal 
BCR and net consumer impact. Feebates also have better EV market share.  
Feebate [118] had a 3.5% greater market share of EVs in 2034 (9.9% above base case) than 
Rebate [110] (both were 20- year scenarios with rebates up to AU$3,000).  The net 
government impacts of AU$0.4B for [118] versus -AU$2.7B for [110] highlights the difference 
in government financial outcomes of a rebate verses feebate policy.  Similarly, Feebate [122] 
had a 6.5% greater market share of EVs in 2034 (16.3% above base case) than Rebate 
[114] (both were 20-year scenarios with rebates up to AU$7,500). In both comparisons, 
carbon savings more than double moving from equivalent rebates to feebates.   
However, increasing the amount of rebates and fees will not have a proportional impact on 
the EV uptake.  In comparing Feebate [118], [122] and [126], which are all feebates with a 
20-year duration, the increase in EV market share from [118] to [122] was much greater than 
[122] to [126].  Scenario [122] had a 6.4% greater impact on EV market share in 2034 than 
[118], but Scenario [126] only had a 3.5% greater impact than [122]. 
6.3 Combined and balanced versus feebates and rebates 
Combined and balanced policies are substantially more effective than feebates or rebates. In 
particular combined/balanced polices have a normalised average of 0.25 compared to 0.16 
for feebates and 0.15 for rebates. Across all the key performance indicators, combined and 
balanced policies outperformed feebates and rebates with the exception of net government 
balance compared to feebates and net consumer impact and societal BCR compared to 
rebates.   
6.4 Best subsidies scenarios versus non-subsidy scenarios 
By comparing the performance of individually implemented, non-subsidy policies (RE-EV, 
CCM, ToU) versus the best subsidy policies, the model predicts that non-subsidy incentives 
performance is mixed compared to the best subsidy scenarios. In particular the best feebate 
and combined/balanced policy subsidies significantly outperform in terms of EV uptake and 
net government impact, but performs below average in societal BCR and worse in terms of 
government gross cost effectiveness. For net government and consumer impact the best 
subsidies are mixed, with the best combined/balanced policy performing above average but 
the feebate was significantly better in net government impact but below average in net 
consumer impact. The best rebate scenario scored highest in terms of societal BCR, but 
across all other indicators performed well below average. This indicates that rebates in 
isolation do not produce good results. Overall if economic and societal indicators should be 
considered more important, then the best performing policy is RE-EV, however if EV market 
share indicators are more important than the [135] combined policy scenario which includes 
RE-EV is the best policy. In either case RE-EV should be implemented either as a 
standalone instrument or as part of a balanced package of policies.  
6.5 Start time and duration of financial subsidies 
All rebates and feebates that start in 2014 and have a 5-year duration were predicted to 
create the smallest amount of change in the EV market share by 2034 (all scenarios are < 
1.5% greater than the base case). Rebates and feebates beginning in 2019, with a 5-year 
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duration all lead to greater EV uptake by 2034 than the same scenarios implemented for 5-
years starting in 2014, albeit the increase is minimal (between 1.3% and 2.3% greater impact 
uptake of EV, relative to each other), however the later time period also decreases the net 
government postive impact. Rebates operating from 2014 – 2034 increased the EV market 
share but significantly decrease the net government positive impact. By comparison for 
feebates, the net government impact was variable and in the case of the 3.5% fees and 
rebates of up AU$12,000 the 20 year scenario outperforms either of the 5 year feebate 
scenarios. Overall, best results were achieved if rebates are applied for 5 years starting in 
2014, whereas for feebates, the best results are achieved if the subsidy is applied for the full 
time period (2014 – 2034).  
7. Conclusions 
This paper explored the relationship between electric vehicle policy and market uptake using 
an innovative diffusion model developed by ISF and the CSIRO incorporating features of 
multi-criteria analysis and choice modelling. Four policy scenarios are tested in the model, 
including Coupling ‘Electric Vehicle Sales-Renewable Energy Purchases’, Financial 
Subsidies, Smart Charging Incentives and creation of a Common Cost Metric.  The RE-EV 
scenario had the strongest performance in terms of economic and societal indicators, 
suggesting non-subsidy policy instruments could be an important policy lever to support the 
uptake of EVs, especially in the case of encouraging BEV adoption. The modelling and 
analysis suggests the feebates were a more effective policy than rebates. Rebate scenarios 
with the time frame 2014-2019 compared better than other rebate scenario timeframes.  
Similarly, the feebates with the 2014 – 2034 time frame performed better than feebate 
scenarios with shorter durations.  The combined policy scenarios and balanced policy 
scenarios (with all four policy types) perform better than implementing just a feebate policy.  
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